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ABSTRACT
People are often confronted with injustice that is done to others.
In such cases, observers (i.e. third-parties) of injustice can restore
justice by punishing the perpetrator, as shown by a vast amount
of research. However, this focus on punishment has led to the
neglect of another behavioural option: compensation of the vic-
tim. The current review focuses on this latter behavioural option.
More speciﬁcally, it is argued that third-parties are more compen-
sation-oriented than previous literature appears to demonstrate.
To support this argument, previous research is discussed and the
factors that might explain observers’ preference for compensation
are outlined. To conclude, suggestions for future research are
presented.
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People are often observers, or the so-called third-parties, to unjust acts that befall
others. For example, they might witness a serious assault, a robbery, a threat, or a
less ‘severe’ form of injustice such as noticing a teacher being stricter to one student
compared to others. The harm can be ﬁnancial, physical, and/or emotional. Simpliﬁed,
these situations contain a perpetrator and a victim, and the unjust act creates an
unbalanced or inequitable situation that needs to be restored (e.g. Van Doorn,
Zeelenberg, & Breugelmans, 2014). The restoration of this unjust situation can take
the form of multiple responses: an observer can choose to punish the perpetrator or to
compensate (or help) the victim. The act of punishing entails sanctioning a perpetrator
who disregarded a (social) norm, whereas compensation entails repairing the harm
done to victim (Darley & Pittman, 2003).
Ever since Kant (1724–1802), who believed in retribution as the only moral justiﬁca-
tion for punishment (see Lind, 1994, for a comprehensible article on Kant’s view on
punishment, including a critical note), most philosophic and scientiﬁc literature has
focused on punitive responses to injustice. Punishment is said to be an intuitive human
response to injustice, even assuming that witnesses of injustice prefer to respond
punitively rather than compensatory (e.g. Carlsmith, 2006; Darley & Pittman, 2003;
Gromet & Darley, 2009b; Van Prooijen, 2010). It has further been suggested that
compensation alone often does not restore justice adequately (Adams & Mullen,
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2015; Darley & Pittman, 2003). Adams and Mullen (2015), for example, found that
observers still considered punishment necessary to restore justice after the victim
received compensation.
However, other studies have nuanced these punishment-focused views. Gromet and
Darley (2009a), for example, argue that people’s need for punishment does not preclude
a desire for restorative actions that address the repairing of the victims’ harm. Multiple
studies show that observers are just as (or even more) likely to choose compensatory as
punitive responses to injustice when given both options (e.g. Leliveld, Van Dijk, & Van
Beest, 2012; Lotz, Okimoto, Schlösser, & Fetchenhauer, 2011; Van de Vyver & Abrams,
2015; Van Doorn et al., 2014; Van Doorn, Breugelmans, Zeelenberg, Berger, &
Okimoto, 2018b).
How is it possible that such opposing results were found? One of the potential
explanations is that the current topic has been studied within diﬀerent ﬁelds (e.g. social
psychology (also referred to as behavioural economics), criminology, law), and using a
variety of research designs (e.g. vignette studies in which committed crimes are
described or economic games in which the unjust situation involves an unfair distribu-
tion of money). For example, punitive and compensatory motivations have been
studied within the ﬁeld of economic games and experimental studies in which partici-
pants have the opportunity to use their own money to punish a perpetrator or
compensate a victim, as well as in situations of injustice outside of such an experimental
setting in which participants have the opportunity to inﬂuence decisions within the
criminal justice system, such as whether a perpetrator should be sentenced or whether
victim support or monetary compensation by the state should be granted. It is con-
ceivable that methodologically diﬀerent studies in diﬀerent ﬁelds lead to diﬀerent
results and diﬀerent conclusions. However, a coherent integration of the diﬀerent
studies in these diﬀerent ﬁelds is lacking. The current review is aimed at integrating
the results from these diﬀerent disciplinary perspectives.
Besides integrating results, the current article will make the case that people are less
punitive than has previously been assumed. By reviewing the current literature on
punitive and compensatory motivations, it is asserted that people actually have a
general preference for compensation to punishment. More speciﬁcally, it is argued
that when people observe injustice (i.e. are not victim or perpetrator themselves),
they would rather compensate a victim than punish a perpetrator when given the
choice. Naturally, a preference for compensation to punishment does not mean that
people believe punishment should not be applied at all – the preference for compensa-
tion merely signals that it should receive more weight.
In conveying this message, the current review focuses on victim compensation, not
restorative justice in general. In this regard, victim compensation is deﬁned as any
action aimed at restoring the victim’s harm (e.g. ﬁnancial compensation, emotional
support, or direct restoration of broken goods), although most often it involves
ﬁnancial compensation. Restorative justice, on the other hand, entails more than victim
compensation only and is deﬁned as ‘a process to involve, to the extent possible, those
who have a stake in a speciﬁc oﬀence and to collectively identify and address harms,
needs, and obligations, in order to heal and put things as right as possible’ (Zehr, 2003,
p. 40). Hence, restorative justice is not necessarily and solely focused on the victim.
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Next to the importance of providing an overview of research ﬁndings on punitive
and compensatory motivations, it is important to gain insight into how third-party
observers respond to injustice and the factors that inﬂuence their (preferred) response,
for legitimacy reasons. Third-party observers’ preferred response to injustice can
inﬂuence satisfaction with the criminal justice system. Tyler (2001) found that citizens
evaluate courts based on how fairly and justly they feel people are treated. Today’s
courts in western society are mainly focused on the punishment of the perpetrator. If it
is true that people actually believe that compensation of victims is as important, or even
more important, than punishment of perpetrators, this might negatively inﬂuence the
legitimacy of the criminal justice system and its ability to elicit compliance with social
norms and laws (Bennet, 2014; Robinson & Darley, 1997; Tyler, 1990, 2001).
As an introduction, several considerations for comparing studies from diﬀerent ﬁelds are
mentioned. Then, the argument that third-party observers of injustice prefer compensatory
responses to punitive responses is presented by describing research that reveals a preference
for compensation. Please note that in this review, an observer can be anyone witnessing or
reading about a harmful act of a perpetrator that aﬀects a victim in a negative way, without
being directly involved in the harmful act (although the observermight be acquaintedwith the
perpetrator and/or victim). The review pursues this by explaining why people prefer com-
pensation, through highlighting the motives and factors underlying the choice for compensa-
tion. From this follows a reﬂection on the question why research also reveals punitive
motivations and sometimes even a preference for punishment. This review then concludes
with summarising main ﬁndings and providing ideas for future research.
Comparing studies from diﬀerent ﬁelds
In this review, studies from diﬀerent ﬁelds of research are considered. Most studies
reside within the ﬁeld of behavioural economics (sometimes regarded as a subﬁeld
within social psychology), which comprises the study of (human) cognitive, social, and
emotional factors in relation to (economic) decision making and behaviour. Several
studies within the ﬁelds of criminology and law are considered in this review as well.
One diﬃculty that arises in comparing studies from these diﬀerent ﬁelds is that
divergent research methods are used. For example, in behavioural economics (experi-
mental) economic-game studies are often used, whereas in criminology and law vign-
ette-studies are more often applied. The diﬀerences between these methods will be
discussed brieﬂy in the light of their advantages and disadvantages (for a more detailed
explanation, please see Madsen & Stenheim, 2015; and Horne & Lovaglia, 2008).
Economic games
Many studies discussed in this review use (experimental) economic games to infer
conclusions about real-life human behaviour and decision making. In these economic
games, subjects are presented with a situation/game that usually includes other (ﬁc-
tional) persons. It studies how subjects behave in these situations/games. Well-known
examples are the public goods dilemma and the dictator game. The public goods
dilemma is a game in which participants secretly decide how much of their own
money they put into a public pot. The amount in the pot is multiplied by a certain
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factor and this public asset is divided equally among all players (also the ones that do
not contribute). Each player can keep the money that they did not contribute.
Most relevant for the current review, however, is the dictator game. In this game, two
persons – a dictator and a recipient – are involved. The dictator gets to distribute some
money between him- or herself and the recipient. The recipient can only accept the
amount that is given to him or her. An adjustment of this game, called the third-party
punishment game (or altruistic punishment game; see Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004), also
involves an observer. The observer observes a dictator game played by the dictator and
the recipient, and has the possibility to punish the dictator after observing his or her
allocation. This game has been regarded as a powerful paradigm to demonstrate
punishing behaviour without possible motives of self-interest such as revenge.
Leliveld et al. (2012) adjusted this game even further, (also) including the option for
the observer to compensate the victim, known as the third-party compensation game or
altruistic compensation game.
An advantage of these designs is that conclusions regarding causes and eﬀects can be
drawn, given that the design is experimental. Further, studies that use economic games
usually use deception to hide the true purpose of the experiment from its subjects. This
can reduce demand characteristics that might distort results. However, the external or
ecological validity of experimental economic game studies might be low. A large
disadvantage is thus that it is unsure to what extent conclusions can be generalised to
real-world situations and behaviours.
Vignette studies
The studies reviewed in this article from the ﬁeld of law and criminology usually use
vignettes in their design. In these studies, subjects are presented with a story about a
realistic criminal oﬀence and are asked to make decisions on how they or the criminal
court system should act. Although vignette studies also often involve an experimental
design, which makes it possible to infer conclusions about cause and eﬀect, the
purpose of these studies is often more obvious for subjects. This makes it possible
that subjects act according to what they expect is wanted in the study (demand
characteristics).
Another critical note regards the hypothetical and ‘anticipated’ nature of vign-
ette studies. That is, the fact that participants are told to picture themselves in the
described situation means that responses reﬂect what people think they would do,
instead of what people would actually do. In other words, responses do not reﬂect
actual behaviour. On the other hand, an advantage of vignette studies is that they
more closely resemble real-world situations than economic games. This might
make it easier to generalise the results. Furthermore, as can be read in the current
review, some research demonstrates that the behavioural intentions stemming
from hypothetical situations closely resemble actual behaviour. All in all, readers
should keep in mind these methodological diﬀerences when reading the current
review.
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A preference for compensation
Non-experimental studies
Some indirect and preliminary support for the idea that people have a preference for victim
compensation to perpetrator punishment can be found in studies investigating public
opinions in the ﬁelds of law and criminology. These studies reveal that the general public is
at least open to alternatives to punishment. Gromet and Darley (2009b), for example, showed
that people are concerned with additional justice goals beyond punishment. In their study,
participants were asked to read vignettes that described crimes and to indicate to what extent
they judged diﬀerent justice goals (amongst others punishment of the oﬀender and restora-
tion of the victim) necessary to be achieved. The results demonstrated that, although
participants were highly concerned with punishing the perpetrator, they judged compensa-
tion of the victim necessary too.
De Keijser, Van der Leeden, and Jackson (2002) studied the attitudes of Dutch
judges in the criminal court system towards the functions and means of punitive
justice interventions. They found that judges are concerned not only with utilitarian,
retributive, and rehabilitative grounds for punishment, but also with restorative
grounds that are more victim-focused like compensation. Further proof for this
idea comes from Roberts and Stalans (2004), who reviewed the literature on the
public opinion about restorative justice procedures, including victim compensation.
They concluded that the general public seemed to be in favour of such restorative
justice procedures, especially in the case of juvenile perpetrators, less severe crimes,
and ﬁrst oﬀenders.
Hence, based on these studies within the ﬁelds of criminology and law, it seems that
people are concerned with the victim and appear positive about compensatory justice
interventions. However, the design of these studies does not allow for an explicit
comparison of (third-party) punitive and compensatory motivations. To be able to
draw some ﬁrmer conclusion about the preference for compensation, experimental
studies are explored in the next section.
Experimental studies
Many studies have been conducted in which third-party observers’ responses to injus-
tice were explored, especially showing that third-parties are motivated to punish
transgressors (e.g. Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Nelissen &
Zeelenberg, 2009). However, a methodological constraint in this regard is that only a
limited number of studies have given attention to (the needs of) victims in such third-
party unjust situations. That is, only few studies included both perpetrator punishment
and victim compensation as justice interventions. This limited set mainly involves the
investigating of punitive and compensatory motivations in economic games.
Importantly, many of these studies were not meant to only examine people’s preference
for compensation or punishment in the case of injustice. Rather, the researchers were
mostly interested in people’s response to injustice as a consequence of their emotional
state, such as anger/moral outrage (Lotz et al., 2011; Van de Vyver & Abrams, 2015;
Van Doorn et al., 2018b), or characteristics, such as empathic concern (Leliveld et al.,
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2012). Below, some of the most important studies that compared compensatory and
punitive responses to injustice are explained.
One of the ﬁrst studies in the ﬁeld of economic games that revealed people’s
preference for compensation in response to injustice is Lotz et al. (2011). They set up
an experiment in which participants were made to believe that they were ‘Person C’ in
an alleged three-person (dictator) game. The participants were told that ‘Person A’ (the
dictator) could allocate 10 euros between him- or herself and ‘Person B’, and that
‘Person A’ choose to keep the 10 euros and gave nothing to ‘Person B’. Next, partici-
pants were given 5 euros, which they could use to increase the money of ‘Person B’
(compensation) and/or reduce the money of ‘Person A’ (punishment). Results showed
that most participants both compensated the victim and punished the perpetrator
(42.6%). Most remaining participants chose to only compensate the victim (32%).
Only a small minority (6.7%) chose to only punish the perpetrator (the remaining
18.5% refrained from any action). In conclusion, this study shows that, within an
economic game, participants rarely opt for solely punitive interventions as a response
to injustice.
Leliveld et al. (2012) compared participants’ willingness to compensate victims to
their willingness to punish perpetrators in several experiments similar to the three-
person games used by Lotz et al. (2011). However, in Leliveld et al.’s (2012) experiment
participants had to choose to either compensate the victim, punish the perpetrator, or
keep the monetary units for themselves. A combination was not possible. Participants
were categorised in two groups, based on their scores on an emphatic concern ques-
tionnaire (high or low). Results showed that in the group with high empathic concern,
54.4% of the participants choose to compensate the victim and 24.3% choose to punish
the perpetrator. In the group with low empathic concern, 47.2% choose to punish the
perpetrator, whereas 22.2% choose to compensate the victim. It thus seems that
compensation was the preferred response only in the group that scored high on
empathic concern.
Although the preference for compensation or punishment is inﬂuenced by people’s
empathic concern, this does not mean that the preference for compensation is solely
dependent upon the level of an individual’s empathic concern. Research has shown that
experiences of anger can be such an inﬂuence as well (and even independently from empathic
concern). For example, in one of Van Doorn et al.’s (2018b) studies participants could use
their own hypothetical money to restore justice by punishing and/or compensating, and in
another study, participants were asked to choose between compensation, punishment, and
keeping the money. In both studies, the researchers found a preference for compensation to
punishment in unjust, anger-eliciting situations. These results are largely in line with Van de
Vyver and Abrams (2015), who showed that, in a three-person computer game, observers
who experienced moral outrage compensated the victim signiﬁcantly more than people who
did not experience moral outrage. Moral outrage did not aﬀect punitive behaviour in this
experiment.
Finally, it appears that this preference for compensation to punishment is quite robust.
In six experimental studies using economic games, Van Doorn, Zeelenberg, and
Breugelmans (2018a) found that the preference for compensation was present even in
cases where the perpetrator has been repeatedly unfair, and where punishment might
restrain a perpetrator to act unfairly again in the future. More speciﬁcally, in three of Van
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Doorn et al.’s (2018a) studies, observers read that a person had played multiple dictator
games with diﬀerent other players and had decided, in each game, to unfairly distribute a
sum of money that was given to him (i.e. to keep 80 or 90 euro/dollar out of 100).
Observers were then given the opportunity to either punish this dictator or compensate
the victim. Furthermore, people preferred compensation even when punishment had a
greater impact in restoring equity than the compensation. That is, when participants could
spend hypothetical money for compensation or punishment, in which every dollar used
for punishment would decrease the dictator’s amount with $3, while $1 compensation
would increase the victim’s amount with $1, still more participants (28%) chose to
compensate the victim instead of punishing the dictator (11%).
Taken together, there appears to be a large body of evidence that supports the notion
that victim compensation is a well-accepted response to injustice, both in the ﬁelds of
law and criminology, as well as in the ﬁelds of (social) psychology and decision making
(using experimental and economic games). More speciﬁcally, third-party observers in
economic games prefer to use their money to compensate the victim over punishing the
perpetrator. In the next section, possible explanations for this preference for compensa-
tion are discussed.
Motivations underlying compensation
The previous paragraph shows that research that has compared both punitive and
compensatory responses to injustice demonstrates a general preference for compensa-
tion. The next question is: why is that the case? There are various motives underlying
compensation that might answer this question, which can roughly be divided into
(social) beneﬁts and individual characteristics.
(Social) Beneﬁts
Compensation has (social) beneﬁts compared to punishment. For example, compensa-
tion could be seen as more eﬃcient for justice restoration than punishment, because it
has the beneﬁt of getting the victim out of the disadvantageous position, whereas
punishment does not. Without compensation, the victim’s harm is not restored
(Darley & Pittman, 2003). On the contrary, the often-applied punishment of incarcera-
tion includes high costs for the government and for the punished perpetrator (e.g. loss
of one’s job), while there is no advantage for victims. Also, in economic games punish-
ment both costs the punisher and reduces the assets of the punished. Compensation on
the other hand could be considered more of a transfer of money in which the victim
gains money (at the cost of the compensator or at the cost of the perpetrator).
Besides being more eﬃcient, compensation can also be seen as more eﬀective than
punishment when recidivism rates are considered. For example, UK statistics showed
that 56.4% of adult oﬀenders who received a community sentence or were released from
custody in 2000 reoﬀend within 9 years. For oﬀenders who served a prison sentence,
this percentage was 78.4% (UK Ministry of Justice, 2012). In the United States, 67.8% of
former prisoners were re-arrested after three years; 76.6% after ﬁve years (US Bureau of
Justice Statistics, 2014). Considering these rather high recidivism rates, people might be
more likely to prefer compensation as a response to injustice. The study by Van Doorn
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et al. (2018a) seems to support this hypothesis. These authors showed that participants
preferred compensation to punishment even in cases where punishment might cause a
perpetrator to refrain from acting unfairly again in the future.
Furthermore, compensation is sometimes related to the possibility of receiving social
rewards. As a result of helping the victim, observers might gain respect, trust, approval,
and recognition, and they are even more likely to experience higher life satisfaction
(Barclay, 2006; Gordon, Madden, & Lea, 2014; Oarga, Stavrova, & Fetchenhauer, 2015).
People are especially willing to help victims to which they are emotionally close or who
are genetically related (O’Gorman, Wilson, & Miller, 2005; Roberts, Vakirtzis,
Kristjándóttis, & Havlícek, 2013; Van Prooijen, 2010). Still, such helping need not be
limited to close ones. Van Doorn et al. (2018a, 2018b) and Van de Vyver and Abrams
(2015), as discussed previously, have shown that people also preferred compensation to
punishment in cases of unacquainted victims of injustice.
Likewise, the potential relational beneﬁts of compensation might be a strong motive
for observers to choose to compensate the victim (e.g. O’Gorman et al., 2005). That is,
compensating or helping a victim might elicit a reciprocal prosocial action from that
victim and thus allows for relationship building, whereas punishment is not likely to
lead to a reciprocal prosocial action by the perpetrator but might, on the contrary, elicit
an antisocial action in the form of reprisals. For example, O’Gorman et al. (2005) let
participants read a scenario in which they learned that they were part of a group that
invested money in the stock market. However, one of the ﬁctional members of this
group expected to earn more proﬁt than was actually realised. As a result, this group
member (the victim in the scenario) was unable to pay his medical bills. O’Gorman
et al. (2005) found that participants showed more sympathy for the victim and were
more willing to help the victim when they were told that there was a high possibility of
future interaction with the victim as opposed to a low possibility of future interaction
with the victim. Thus, especially when someone cooperates with or helps an individual
who she/he is likely to meet again in the future, the chance exists that this individual
will return the favour. Importantly though, O’Gorman et al.’s (2005) scenario did not
contain a true perpetrator, as the victim’s fate was due to bad luck. Possibly the eﬀects
of potential future interaction are diﬀerent when a perpetrator is involved. Still,
potential future interaction does not seem to be a required element for people to prefer
compensation. Also in the so-called one-shot economic games, in which players play a
single game in which they have the opportunity to compensate or punish, this pre-
ference exists (e.g. Lotz et al., 2011; Van Doorn et al., 2018a, 2018b).
Individual factors
Next to the potential (social) beneﬁts that could make compensation more appealing
than punishment, individual factors and characteristics may underlie observers’ pre-
ference for compensation. For example, in a series of studies, Sargent (2004) inter-
viewed participants about their attitude towards the punishment of criminals. Also,
participants answered questions to indicate their need for cognition; the extent to which
they enjoy and engage in eﬀortful cognitive activity. The results showed that people
who have a high need for cognition are less supportive of punitive responses to crime.
Sargent (2004) argues that these individuals tend to generate more complex attributions
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for human behaviour, and hence that they are more likely to attribute a criminal’s
behaviour to societal inﬂuence. Together, this might explain why people with a high
need for cognition are more lenient towards perpetrators.
A personality trait linked to a preference for compensatory responses is empathic
concern (Leliveld et al., 2012). Empathic concern can be deﬁned as ‘other-oriented
feelings or sympathy and concern for unfortunate others’ (Davis, 1983, as cited in
Leliveld et al., 2012). In their study, Leliveld and colleagues discovered that people who
scored high on empathic concern were more likely to choose compensation over
punishment when given both options, whereas people who scored low on empathic
concern were more likely to choose punishment over compensation. Hu, Strang, and
Weber (2015) also showed that people with high empathic concern helped receivers of
unfair oﬀers in a dictator game more frequently and were faster in their decision.
Several constructs related to empathic concern have been studied in the context of
punishment and compensation as well. These constructs are (1) compassion (deﬁned as
the cognitive and emotional experience of concern in response to others’ suﬀering
associated with a motivation to promote the well-being of others; McCall, Steinbeis,
Ricard, & Singer, 2014)); (2) justice sensitivity (deﬁned as a stable and consistent
interpersonal diﬀerence in people’s inclination to perceive situations as justice-
relevant, as well as in the strength of emotional and behavioural responses to such
situations (Lotz, Schlösser, Cain, & Fetchenhauer, 2013)), and (3) Social Value
Orientation (SVO) in which an individual is described as a ‘prosocial’ (deﬁned as
having a natural tendency to act prosocially/those who gain positive utility from
increasing other persons’ welfare) or a ‘proself’ (deﬁned as having a natural tendency
to act more selﬁshly; Messick & McClintock, 1968; Van Lange, 1999)). Research has
shown that compassion can counteract an observer’s desire to punish perpetrators, even
when this compassion is felt towards someone else than the perpetrator or the victim
(Condon & DeSteno, 2011). McCall et al. (2014) showed that practitioners who had
engaged mental training exercises including compassion-related meditation were more
likely to recompense victims in a dictator game as compared to meditation-naïve
controls. Also, people scoring high on justice sensitivity for others behaved more
altruistically in economic games than participants who scored low on justice sensitivity
for others (Lotz et al., 2013; Stavrova & Schlösser, 2015). That is, these participants
shared money more equally in a dictator game. Furthermore, participants who scored
high on justice sensitivity for others claimed less money from the winners (chosen by a
random draw) of the game than participants who scored low on justice sensitivity for
others. These results are in concordance with research on SVO showing that prosocials
are more likely to split money evenly than proselfs (Van Lange, 1999). Hence, as with
empathic concern, it might be argued that people scoring high on compassion, on
justice sensitivity for others, or those characterised as a prosocial might also be more
likely to choose compensation over punishment.
Next to feeling concerned for someone else (i.e. empathic feelings), people can also take
the perspective of others. This can be deﬁned as the capability of individuals to place
themselves in the shoes of others and thereby deducing how the other is feeling without
explicit emotional cues such as crying (Will, Crone, Van den Bos, & Güroğlu, 2013). Will
et al. (2013) studied how adolescents reacted to the observed social exclusion of a peer. They
discovered that participants who were adept in state aﬀective perspective-taking (measured
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by a comparison between the mood of the participant and the observed mood of the victim)
showed both enhanced compensation of the victim (the excluded peer) and punishment of
the perpetrators (the ones who excluded this peer). Thus, unlike empathic concern, being able
to put yourself in the shoes of a victim does not only lead to an increase in compensatory
reactions, but also to an increase in punitive reactions to injustice. This diﬀerence is not
completely surprising when keeping inmind that punitive responses might bemore likely for
victims of injustice than for observers of injustice (see Van Doorn et al., 2014).
Although previous research suggests that third-parties who possess certain person-
ality traits might be more likely to opt for compensation as a response to injustice than
third-parties who do not possess these traits, this does not mean that these personality
traits are a requirement for ﬁnding a preference for compensation. It seems that
injustice in itself (albeit via the experience of anger) can lead to a preference for
compensation over punishment (e.g. Lotz et al., 2011; Van Doorn et al., 2018a, 2018b).
Why some studies demonstrate a preference for punishment
Although a considerable amount of research has shown that people prefer compensa-
tion over punishment, other studies have demonstrated the opposite: a preference for
punishment. Inﬂuential authors maintain that punishment is an intuitive human
response to injustice (e.g. Carlsmith, 2006; Darley & Pittman, 2003; Gromet &
Darley, 2009b; Van Prooijen, 2010). The following section seeks to explain these
seemingly contradicting ﬁndings. In order to understand why people punish in the
ﬁrst place, this section starts with a short overview of motives underlying punishment.
Utility and retribution
Two main justiﬁcations or motives that have been put forward for why people resort to
punishment are utility and retribution (e.g. Carlsmith, 2006; Carlsmith, Darley, & Robinson,
2002; Darley, Carlsmith, & Robinson, 2000). Both motives have been discussed by important
thinkers like BenthamandKant (e.g.Draper, 2002; Lind, 1994). JeremyBentham (1748–1832)
is considered the founding father of the utilitarian theory of justice. Regarding punishment,
Bentham believed that punishment should always have a beneﬁt to society as a whole. It
should, for example, deter the oﬀender himself and/or the general public from committing a
similar crime (again). If a similar crime would, hypothetically, never be committed in the
future, punishment was not needed according to Bentham (see Draper (2002) for an explana-
tion and evaluation of Bentham’s view on punishment). The utilitarian stance justiﬁes
punishment by pointing to the positive consequences of punishment, in particular deterrence
and incapacitation (Carlsmith, 2006). The idea behind deterrence is that both the punished
perpetrator and the general public learn that the negative consequences of norm violations
outweigh their beneﬁts. Further, incapacitation can prevent criminals from committing future
crimes by imprisoning them (Darley & Pittman, 2003). Punishing the perpetrator might
therefore make society safer (Adams & Mullen, 2015), and it might increase normative
behaviour for both the perpetrator and the general public (Fehr & Gächter, 2002). In line
with these utilitarian ideas is the possibility that observers of injusticemight choose to punish
the perpetrator instead of compensating the victim, because perpetrators are a danger to
society while victims are not (Van Prooijen, 2010).
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Nevertheless, research has shown that people rarely rely on utility when they have to
come up with a punishment for norm violators themselves, even though they usually
express favourable attitudes towards utilitarian reasons for punishment (Aharoni &
Fridlund, 2012; Carlsmith, 2006; Darley & Pittman, 2003). Carlsmith (2006) asked
participants to select information needed to determine prison sentences for criminal
oﬀences. The information could be retributive in nature (e.g. severity of the harm and
extenuating circumstances) or utilitarian (e.g. risk of violence of the perpetrator and
crime frequency). Carlsmith found that people more often select retributive informa-
tion for sentencing criminals than utilitarian information. Aharoni and Fridlund (2012)
also showed that participants, who ﬁrst read vignettes about criminal oﬀences and were
then asked to recommend punishment, recommended punishment of the perpetrator
even when there were no practical advantages of punishment, such as speciﬁc or general
deterrence. As argued by Aharoni and Fridlund (2012), such sentence decisions based
on retribution seem to be a form of heuristic decision making. That is, participants do
not explicitly believe that retribution justiﬁes punishment, as favourable attitudes
towards utilitarian reasons for punishment are expressed, but have a heuristic inclina-
tion towards retributive responses to injustice without being consciously aware of that.
This is also the commonly used explanation when researchers ﬁnd that observers tend
to respond with punishment to injustice.
Methodological and situational constraints
So, how is it possible that some studies demonstrate a preference for compensation,
whereas others show a preference for punishment? Methodological and situational con-
straints in previous research might, at least partly, answer this question. Sometimes a
third-party might have a motivation to respond to injustice in a compensatory way, but
the situation does not allow for such a response. For example, in many studies that use
economic games with unfair distributions of money, only punitive responses are studied
(e.g. Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Fehr & Gächter, 2002). In economic games, people might
indeed be motivated to punish because another more prosocial option is absent. As a
result, participants might be viewed as more punitive than they really are. Some studies do
measure both compensation and punishment, but do not compare the two justice
responses (e.g. Gummerum, Van Dillen, Van Dijk, & López-Pérez, 2016). Also outside
of economic games, in more real-life settings, it is likely that situational constraints
inﬂuence how observers of injustice handle these situations. Observers might, for exam-
ple, be more likely to compensate the victim when the perpetrator remains unidentiﬁed,
and punishment is not possible. Alternatively, when crimes result in harm that cannot be
(fully) compensated, as in the case of murder, punishment of the perpetrator might be a
more satisfactory outcome. Unfortunately, no studies to date have investigated such
situational constraints on the motivation for punishment or compensation.
Moreover, the studies investigating third-party punishment and compensation diﬀer
in whether these behavioural options are costly or not. That is, studies that use
economic games usually give participants the opportunity to spend (hypothetical)
money on punishment, on compensation, or both (or participants can keep the
money for themselves). Thus, in these studies both compensatory and punitive
responses are costly to the participant. In such cases, it was found that participants
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were willing to both compensate the victim and punish the perpetrator, but most
participants seemed to prefer compensatory responses to injustice (e.g. Chavez &
Bicchieri, 2013; Lotz et al., 2011; Van de Vyver & Abrams, 2015).
In contrast, in studies concerning decisions within the criminal justice system,
participants are not made aware of the costs of punishment and compensation like in
economic game studies (e.g. Aharoni & Fridlund, 2012; Carlsmith, 2006). Therefore, it
is likely that participants do not involve the costs of punishment and compensation in
their decision. To illustrate, in Van Prooijen’s (2010) studies, compensatory and
punitive interventions were either all paid by the perpetrator, or the participants’
preference was deducted from the kind of information they judged necessary to
answer the question whether justice will prevail. In the latter case, participants
could request more information about aspects of the situation (regarding perpetrator
punishment and victim compensation) they thought were necessary to answer the
question whether justice had prevailed or not. In both cases, participants seemed to
prefer punitive justice interventions to compensatory justice interventions. That is,
participants recommended punitive justice interventions over compensatory justice
intervention when the perpetrator paid for the justice interventions, and participants
requested more information on punishment of the perpetrator than on compensation
of the victim (Van Prooijen, 2010).
Hence, it seems that compensatory responses to injustice are preferred to punitive
responses when justice responses are costly to the observer. This might also explain why
Adams and Mullen (2015) found that participants still judged punishment of the
perpetrator necessary to restore justice after they learned that the victim had been
compensated. This study considered both compensatory and punitive responses in a
vignette-study. The researchers found that participants were equally willing to punish
the perpetrator after they heard that the victim had been compensated as compared to
when the victim had not been compensated. However, participants were less willing to
compensate the victim after they heard the perpetrator had been punished as compared
to when the perpetrator had not been punished. Perhaps, when participants are not
aware of the costliness of diﬀerent responses to injustice, they make an intuitive
decision rather than a more deliberate decision. If the intuitive response to injustice
is punishment (e.g. Aharoni & Fridlund, 2012), this might explain why participants still
wanted to punish the perpetrator after they heard the victim had been compensated,
but were less willing to compensate the victim after they heard the perpetrator had been
punished. Based on their intuitive reaction, justice had, after all, been restored.
In sum, observers might prefer compensation to punishment only when their own
resources are at stake (or at least are made aware of the costliness of justice interventions).
But why would costliness matter in the preference for a justice-restoring response? It
might be the case that when justice-restoring interventions are costly, observers are more
likely to carefully consider how to spend their money. They might choose the interven-
tions that are most beneﬁcial to them. As mentioned previously, victim compensation is
more likely to lead to gaining respect, approval and recognition, and the possibility of
future reciprocal help than punishment (e.g. Lotz et al., 2011; O’Gorman et al., 2005;
Oarga et al., 2015). Besides, when making a deliberate decision, observers might pay more
attention to the victim, than when they make a more intuitive decision. Gromet and
Darley (2009a) and Gummerum et al. (2016) all argue that paying attention to the victim
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might increase the judged necessity of victim compensation. To illustrate, Gummerum
et al. (2016) found that observers in a third-party compensation game spend more money
on victim compensation when they were experimentally manipulated to experience
victim-focused (rather than self-focused) anger. Furthermore, when punishment and
compensation are not costly, people might be less likely to make a deliberate, well-
considered decision on how to respond to injustice. Instead, they might be more likely
to rely on heuristics, leading to a more punitive response (e.g. Aharoni & Fridlund, 2012).
Crime severity
The severity of a crime can shape behavioural responses as well (e.g. Gromet & Darley,
2006; Rucker, Polifroni, Tetlock, & Scott, 2004). Gromet and Darley (2006) found that
participants were more likely to judge retributive punishment necessary as the criminal
court cases they read about became more severe. These same authors (2009b) stated that
when a crime is severe enough, people’s ‘automatic’ retributive response to injustice is
activated. Could it be that people judge transgressions in real-life as more severe than
transgression within experimental games, and that punishment is therefore more likely in
studies that use real-life situations? Previous ﬁndings indicate that people were willing to
spend more game money on compensation than punishment (e.g. Chavez & Bicchieri,
2013; Lotz et al., 2011; Van de Vyver & Abrams, 2015; Van Doorn et al., 2018a, 2018b).
However, in more real-life scenarios (tax dodging or robbery), as used in studies by Van
de Vyver and Abrams (2015) and Van Prooijen (2010), this preference was not found. It
thus seems possible that people judge transgressions within experimental games to be less
severe than transgressions in the real world, because injustice in the real world often has
more severe consequences. However, based on the design of the diﬀerent studies, direct
comparison is diﬃcult. It could be argued that a preference for compensation in severe,
real-world scenarios is likely as well, as the victim’s harm is often also more substantial in
such cases.
Gromet, Okimoto, Wenzel, and Darley (2012) showed that victim satisfaction, relative
to dissatisfaction, with a restorative justice process (a facilitated meeting between the
oﬀender and the victim to come to an agreement on how the oﬀender can repair the harm
caused to the victim) attenuates a third-party’s desire to seek oﬀender punishment,
regardless of oﬀence severity. This relationship was explained by the informational value
of victim satisfaction: participants inferred that victims felt closure which in turn elevated
participants’ satisfaction with the restorative justice outcome. This seems in line with
research by Van de Calseyde, Zeelenberg, and Keren (2013) in which participants
punished perpetrators of theft less (i.e. recommended a lower number of days for the
perpetrator to spend in community service) than when they transgressed against an
insured victim as compared to an uninsured victim. The insurance, which might be
viewed as a form of compensation, made participants judge the situation as less severe.
Though, Adams and Mullen (2015) found that participants still felt that punishment was
necessary after a victim had received compensation. It might be the case that participants
are more inclined to punish when they are confronted with a statement that punishment
(in general) is needed (Adams &Mullen), than when they have to specify how severe this
punishment should be (or how much punishment is needed; Van de Calseyde et al.,
2013). The latter seems to generate more nuanced responses in participants.
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Individual factors
People might be less likely to respond in a compensatory way to injustice when they
hold a negative opinion towards the victim, as found in people who score high on the
need to belief in a just world (BJW; Hafer & Bègue, 2005; Lerner & Simmons, 1966).
People who hold this belief trust that individuals get their ‘just deserts’. When high BJW
observers witness unjust situations, they might feel the need to somehow ﬁt this
injustice with their notion of a just world by blaming the victim for his or her fate.
When observers hold the victim responsible for the victim’s fate, they might feel less
inclined to help the victim (Hafer & Bègue, 2005; Lerner & Simmons, 1966). In line
with this idea, Wakslak, Jost, Tyler, and Chen (2007) concluded that the belief in
system-justiﬁcation ideologies predicts less helping of people in a disadvantageous
position. System-justiﬁcation ideologies are beliefs that function as excuses for the
current unjust social circumstances, and hence make people feel better. However,
whether and how these factors inﬂuence the preference for compensation or punish-
ment has not (yet) been studied.
Conclusions and ideas for further research
This review examined the current literature on third-party observers’ responses to
injustice for the claim that people have a preference for compensation to punishment,
and sought to highlight factors that explain this preference. A synthesis of the literature
from diﬀerent ﬁelds (e.g. psychology, criminology, law) and their own research designs
led to a disclosure of several situational as well as individual factors which could
inﬂuence the justice-restoring response of third-parties.
Indeed, research shows that people are less punitive than has been previously
assumed, especially in the ﬁeld of social psychology/behavioural economics. This
might in part be due to the limited choice set: most studies in this ﬁeld did not include
a prosocial option such as compensation of the victim next to the option to punish the
perpetrator. A second contributing factor to the ﬁnding that people seem more com-
pensatory-oriented than previously thought, pertains to the costliness of one’s beha-
viour. Being aware of the costliness of the options of compensation and punishment
(i.e. participants have to spend their own (hypothetical) money to punish and/or
compensate) might cause people to more deliberately choose the option of compensa-
tion, which seems to have more (social) beneﬁts. In the case of non-experimental
studies, often used in the ﬁelds of criminology and law, the costs of punishment and
compensation are not brought to one’s awareness. Perhaps people make more intuitive/
heuristic decisions in such cases, opting for a punitive instead of a compensatory
response to injustice. It should be noted though that Van Doorn et al. (2018a) also
found that when people can choose between punishment or not acting at all (the option
to compensate is not included), people prefer the latter.
Previous research has also mainly studied the motivation to compensate and punish
separately instead of simultaneously. This leaves many questions unanswered. When
people with retributive motives learn that there is a possibility of future interaction with
the victim, do they still prefer a punitive response to injustice? Furthermore, do people
more often opt for compensation when this justice-restoring intervention is costly as
compared to when it is not costly? The questions are possible avenues for future
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research. Another suggestion for future research comprises the investigation of the
preference for punitive and compensatory responses in the case of severe and less severe
unjust situations. Current studies that diﬀer in results often also diﬀer in the use of
severe and less severe unjust situations (unfair distributions of money in an economic
game versus carjacking).
It is also worth investigating whether punishment involves a more heuristically based
decision than compensation. It might be the case that third-parties’ initial, automatic, or
heuristic response is punishment (e.g. Aharoni & Fridlund, 2012; Carlsmith, 2006; Gromet &
Darley, 2006; Van Prooijen, 2010), but when given time or opportunity to think about their
behavioural response, compensation is more likely. That is, people might rely on heuristics as
low-eﬀort judgmental strategies (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996) when observing
injustice, but process the arguments for other justice-restoring interventionsmore elaborately
when such options are available. Some preliminary support for this idea can be found in
research by Sargent (2004), indicating that individuals high in need for cognition (those who
enjoy and engage in eﬀortful cognitive activity)were less supportive of punitivemeasures than
their low need for cognition counterparts. Additionally, people’s default response may be to
focus on the oﬀender and punishment, but one of Gromet and Darley’s (2009a) studies
showed that when people think about the concerns related to the victim, people were also
interested in fulﬁlling justice goals for the victim. This seems to indicate that, when it comes to
the restoration of justice, people’s more controlled reasoning system considers justice goals
other than punishment as well.
The current review has focused on the preference for compensation over punish-
ment, but these are, of course, not the only possible reactions to injustice. For example,
victims of primarily property crimes and minor assaults are given the opportunity to
meet the oﬀender, known as victim oﬀender mediation (Umbreit, 2001). With the
assistance of a trained mediator, the victim is able to let the oﬀender know how the
crime aﬀected him or her and to receive answers to questions, while the oﬀender is able
to take direct responsibility for his or her behaviour, to learn of the full impact of what
he or she did, and to develop a plan for making amends to the person he or she violated
(Umbreit, Coates, & Vos, 2004). Such restorative justice dialogue can lead to a greater
sense of closure and healing and is often regarded as a movement that furthers
forgiveness and reconciliation (Armour & Umbreit, 2006). Forgiveness is a process in
which negative aﬀects, cognitions, and behaviours are replaced by more positive feelings
(Enright & Gassin, 1992), and can make an individual decreasingly less motivated to
retaliate (Karremans & Van Lange, 2004). Forgiveness has been discussed within
perpetrator rehabilitation as well. The eﬀectiveness of many oﬀender rehabilitation
programs such as anger management may be further enhanced by the inclusion of
interventions that build on the motivation to change and to be forgiving (Day, Gerace,
Wilson, & Howells, 2008).
This review discussed research showing a preference for compensation, and the separate
motives and factors that help explain this preference. However, the exact explanation for why
people prefer compensation to punishment is something that deserves further research. That
is, further research is essential to investigate the signiﬁcance and contribution of diﬀerent
factors in predicting and explaining justice-restoring responses and preferences in third-
parties.
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